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The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent stranded Russian-speaking diaspora in 
former Soviet republics created a unique environment for testing the effect of political 
institutions and economic climate on minority integration. Using descriptive quantitative data 
and over 30 interviews performed in Russian while living in Estonia and Kyrgyzstan, I analyze 
the levels of integration of these Russian-speaking minorities. Estonia and Kyrgyzstan provide 
the necessary conditions to test the effect of political institutions and economic climate on 
minority integration because they differ dramatically in these areas after independence. In 
comparing the two Russian-speaking minorities, I also assess overall identification, personal 
relation to the Russian Federation, general relation to the titular population, and reactions to 
Ukraine and Crimea.  
My findings from both Estonia and Kyrgyzstan reveal that both minority groups have 
integrated into their host countries, but the degree of that integration differs substantially. The 
more robust Estonian economy and the inherent benefits from European Union membership 
prevented mass emigration after 1991, but slight discriminatory citizenship and Russian language 
policies result in a less integrated Russian community that tends towards local identification. 
The more accommodating Kyrgyz governmental policies, both in terms of citizenship and the 
Russian language, created a highly integrated minority population, but the poor economic 
climate of Kyrgyzstan incentivized the majority of the Russian-speaking community to 
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immigrate back to Russia. The separate levels of integration and different forms of 
identification achieved by both communities suggest that political institutions largely effect 
integration, but economic climate dictates emigration and can mitigate detrimental effects 
from discriminatory political institutions.  
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PREFACE 
Writing this thesis was an incredible experience that has defined my time as an undergraduate. I 
would like to thank all my committee members for their input and help in finalizing my research. 
Specifically, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Jennifer Murtazashvili, for her help and 
guidance over the nearly three years I have worked on this project.  
1 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Minorities that fail to integrate into their countries often pose problems to both those countries’ 
governance and society. It is important, therefore, to understand what affects their integration. 
The political and economic environments in which minority groups live are potentially the 
largest factors regarding a minority’s position. What effect do political institutions and the 
economic climate have on the integration of minority groups?  
The collapse of the Soviet Union offers a means for testing this question. The collapse of 
the USSR resulted in a divergence of political institutions and economic climate within each 
post-Soviet state. While each state traveled on different developmental paths, the existence of a 
Russian-speaking minority often remained a constant factor. Using the integration of Russian-
speaking minorities as the dependent variable, I can test the effect of the independent variables: 
political institutions and economic climate.  I will, therefore, examine the integration of Russian-
speaking minority groups within specific post-Soviet states to explore this question.  
Within the post-Soviet region specifically, the question of integration is even more 
important, considering the Russian-speaking minority has been a geopolitical factor in terms of 
the Russian government’s strategies and position towards the “near abroad.” Understanding 
current integration levels of Russian-speakers will explore areas of potential instability in the 
post-Soviet region. Broadly, better knowing what factors effect integration provides more 
information for policy making aimed at improving integration and domestic stability.  
2 
2.0  THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
For the purposes of this study, I will use the term Russian-speaking diaspora to refer to groups of 
Russian-speaking populations in the post-Soviet sphere. This diaspora, within this geographic 
context, has been a focus for many scholars because of the conditions regarding its creation. 
When the Soviet Union collapsed many Russians and Russian speakers living in Soviet republics 
outside of Russia became minorities in the newly created post-Soviet states. In this sense they are 
stranded minorities because the political system in which they were the majority population 
receded from them.1 This then became a focus of interest for notable scholars such as David 
Laitin and Rogers Brubacker who were interested in how these minority groups identify and the 
relationship they have to the Russian Federation.  
Scholarly work regarding this diaspora has an enormous issue, however, in how to define 
the “Russian diaspora?” Defining this community as ethnically Russian fails to consider the 
complexities concerning the diaspora. Scholars have struggled to define the Russian diaspora, 
finding that many non-ethnic Russians identify with the Russian minority and by extension the 
diaspora. In each post-Soviet state there are ethnic Ukrainian, Byelorussians, Tartars, and other 
groups who speak Russian as their primary language. They are distinct from the titular 
1 Charles King and Neil J. Melvin, “Diaspora Politics,” International Security 24, no. 3 (1999): 108. 
3 
populations either by appearance and/or by cultural identification. They are a part of the Russian-
speaking diaspora, but are not ethnically Russian. 
Some scholars preferred to simply use “ethnic Russians”2 as the focus of their work. 
Others, in response to this complexity, began to use terms like “Russian-settlers”3 to refer to 
Russified communities in the post-Soviet states. I will use the term Russian-speaking (Русский 
Говорящий) instead, which refers to people in the post-Soviet states who speak Russian as their 
native language. This term has become increasingly popular in the Baltic States, but poses some 
issues in Central Asia because there are titular population members who speak Russian as their 
native language. I will not include these individuals as Russian-speakers, however, as they would 
identify with the titular population as their primary identity and not as a Russian-speaker. 
Russian-speakers will refer to people who are consider Russian as their primary native language 
and are physically or culturally distinct from the titular population. 
Scholars have approached the diaspora in different ways. David Laitin was primarily 
concerned with how these minority groups identified. His hypothesis and findings being that they 
would eventually create a “new national form” or a diaspora level identification, based of 
interviews and case studies in four post-Soviet states.4 Laitin’s research was in part a follow up 
to Rogers Brubacker’s work regarding diaspora studies in general, but also specifically the 
relationship between the Russian-speaking diaspora and the Russian Federation. Brubacker 
created a conceptual triangular configuration between national minorities, the states in which 
2 Lowell W. Barrington, Erik S. Herron, and Brian D. Silver, “The Motherland Is Calling: Views of Homeland among Russians in the near Abroad,” World Politics 55, no. 2 (2003): 290–313.  3 Charles King and Neil J. Melvin. 4 David D. Laitin. Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near 
Abroad. (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1998). (Laitin, 1998)  
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they live, and the external homeland.5 The Russian-speaking diaspora plays a geopolitical role in 
the region broadly, as evidenced by the clause in the Russian constitution granting it the right to 
protect Russian-speakers abroad.6 Considering the numerous conflicts and events concerning the 
Russian-speaking diaspora, including recent events in Crimea and Ukraine, Brubacker’s 
relationship model retains its usefulness in any discussion of the diaspora within the region.  
Brubacker develops the idea that Russia acts as an external homeland for its ethnic 
diaspora, thereby granting the Russian Federation the option to involve itself in other countries if 
it feels it should act to protect the interests of ethno national kin outside of its borders.7 The host 
countries recognize this fact and therefore attempt to integrate the minority groups to prevent 
influence from the external homeland, or in this case Russia. Finally, the minority group itself is 
often caught between the two states, their current home and their external homeland. Depending 
on the pressures and issues facing the minority they can potentially mobilize against their state of 
residence, seeking autonomy or to join the external homeland.8 This triangular relationship 
results in a situation in which all three parties constantly monitor the actions of each other to 
maintain their positions and maximize their benefits.  
Brubacker’s model suggests that the Russian-speaking diaspora is potentially 
destabilizing in the post-Soviet states because depending on a minority group’s perceptions or 
Russian involvement, minority groups can pursue autonomy or be used to rationalize Russian 
involvement. I argue, therefore, that especially after events in Ukraine and Crimea in which 
5 Rogers Brubacker, “National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe,” Daedalus 124, no. 2 (1995): 107–32. 6 Lowell W. Barrington, Erik S. Herron, and Brian D. Silver. 7 Rogers Brubacker. 8 Rogers Brubacker. 
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arguably both results occurred, understanding what factors effect Russian-speaking minority 
integration into their host countries is even more important than ever. In testing for the effect of 
political institutions and economic climate on integration, I will also explore to what degree 
certain Russian-speaking minorities have integrated. Much like other scholars, I will use specific 
post-Soviet states and Russian-speaking minorities as cases for examination. 
6 
3.0  CASES: ESTONIA AND KYRGYZSTAN 
My cases are Estonia and Kyrgyzstan. Previous scholars have compared Russian-speaking 
minorities in the Baltic and Central Asian republics. Laitin analyzed Estonia and Kazakhstan as 
cases for his study in the years following the dissolution of the USSR.9  Michele Commercio 
also used this approach when studying the Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia and 
Kyrgyzstan.10  In many ways, this work is a reexamination of Laitin and Commercio’s work, 
which were concerned with the initial identification of the Russian-speaking diaspora and causal 
factors behind emigration respectively. These works, however, analyzed these countries in the 
90’s and early 2000s. Also I am primarily concerned with the integration achieved by the 
Russian-speaking minority as opposed to specifically focusing on either identification or 
emigration. Regardless, Laitin’s and Commercio’s works prove the effectiveness of using a 
comparative case study between a Baltic and Central Asian State. Both Estonia and Kyrgyzstan 
have been used in comparative pieces because they meet the necessary conditions to be effective 
cases, but the two, specifically, have yet to be used together in a comparative study.   
Bordering Russia, Estonia has had long interactions with its larger and more powerful 
neighbor. The territory of modern Estonia was incorporated into the Russian empire in 1721 with 
9 David D. Laitin.10 Michele E. Commercio, “The Russian Minorities in Latvia and Kyrgyzstan,” Problems 
of  Post-Communism, no. 25 (2004). 
7 
the Treaty of Nystad that united Northern Estonia and Southern Estonia (Livonia) as one Russian 
territory.11 It briefly gained independence in 1918 and was an independent country for 22 years 
before being seized by the Soviet Union in 1939 after the Molotov-Ribbentron Non-
aggression pact.12 Under Soviet control, many ethnic Russians and other Russian-speaking 
minorities moved to Estonia, which occurred in combination with varying degrees of 
Soviet influence throughout the country.13 Estonian and Russian were used as languages for 
instruction in both secondary and higher education, but in 1978 an official Moscow policy 
sought to increase the role of the Russian language in non-Russian Soviet republics and the 
Russian language gained a larger role in education.14  
Soviet influence and fears of Russification were met with resistance and protest within 
Estonia.15 Eventually, following protests in the Baltic republics and instability within the Soviet 
Union broadly, a national referendum in 1991 declared the restoration of the independent 
Republic of Estonia.16 The original annexation, Soviet policies, and culture of resistance initially 
resulted in the Estonian government adopting discriminatory polices towards the now Russian-
speaking minority in the post-Soviet period. 
11 Riina Kionka and Raivo Vetik, “Estonia and the Estonians,” in The Nationalities in the 
Post-Soviet States, ed. Graham Smith, 2nd ed. (Essex, England: Longman, 1996).  
12 Riina Kionka and Raivo Vetik.13 Hill Kulu, “Residence and Migration in Post-War Soviet Estonia: The Case of Russian-Born 
Estonians,” Vanemuise 46 (2003).;
Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, “Estimating Russification of Ethnic Identity Among 
Non-Russians in the USSR,” Demography 20 (1983). 14 Riina Kionka and Raivo Vetik. 15 Fredrik Lars Stocker, Bridging the Baltic Sea: Networks of Resistance and Opposition during 
the Cold War Era (Lexington Books, 2012). 
16 Riina Kionka and Raivo Vetik. 
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Immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the newly independent Estonian 
government did not recognize the Russian language as either a governmental or official language 
in Estonia.17 Then government officials introduced legislation that called into question whether 
Russian-speakers could receive citizenship. The government mandated that only Russian-
speakers and other non-Estonians who could prove they had lineage in Estonia from before 
Soviet occupation could gain citizenship.18 All others had to pass an Estonian citizenship exam 
with an Estonian language component.19 This prevented the majority of Russian-speakers living 
in Estonia from attaining citizenship, which in turn almost resulted in violent conflict when 
Narva, a Russian-speaking dominated city, nearly voted to become autonomous in 1993 due 
to citizenship concerns.20 The Estonian government, however, avoided conflict by scaling 
back discriminatory policies, allowing non-citizens to vote in municipal elections, and loosening 
citizenship requirements, a trend that has continued over time.21  
Due to this change in policy, therefore, tension between Russian-speakers and the 
Estonian government decreased significantly. Some Russians-speakers in Estonia, however, still 
lack any citizenship whatsoever, remaining stateless with “Alien” or grey passports.22 Also, 
17 Riina Kionka and Raivo Vetik. 
18 Raivo Vetik, “Citizenship, Statelessness and Belonging in Estonia,” in Political Incorporation 
of Immigrant-Origin Minorities (ECPR General Conference, Reykjavik, 2011),.  
https://ecpr.eu/filestore/paperproposal/3e77f4ab-9a20-4440-b23c-0746c8bce314.pdf. 
19 Vetik, Raivo, “Citizenship, Statelessness and belonging in Estonia,” 
20 Indrek Elling, “The 1993 Narva Referendum Crisis,” in Crisis Management in Estonia: Case 
Studies and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Eric Stern and Daniel Nohrstedt (Stockholm: 
Försvarshögskolan, 2001), 43–78. 21 Anna Gromilova, “Statelessness: Challenging the ‘Europeanness’ in the Baltics,” Revista 
de Stiinte Politice, no. 47 (2015): 268.
22 David J. Trimbach, “Lost in Conflation: The Estonian City of Narva and Its Russian-
Speakers,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2016, https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/05/lost-
conflation-estonian-city-narva-russian-speakers/. 
9 
some barriers remain, such as higher education being instructed only in Estonian and that 
Russian-speakers have little to no governmental representation.23 Largely, however, the situation 
in Estonia is unique in that the Russian-speaking minority exists mostly separate from the 
Estonian majority.  
An important consideration is that Estonia joined the European Union in 2004, which 
granted Estonian citizens access to European markets and prompted Estonia’s overall economic 
growth. Another important effect was that the requirements for European Union ascension 
incentivized the Estonian government to continue to scale back discriminatory practices towards 
Russian-speakers.24 European Union membership also allowed easy travel access throughout 
Europe and many other countries, which by extension benefited Russian-speakers with Estonian 
passports and Russian-speaking grey passport holders. Ironically, this is even more beneficial to 
stateless Russian-speakers because grey passports allow the same access to Europe as Estonian 
passports, but also easy access to the Russian Federation.25  
The Russian-speaking minority in Estonia, therefore, originally endured discriminatory 
political practices from its host country that have slowly eased over time. Throughout this period, 
however, it has also enjoyed a relatively superior economic position. Estonia’s historical 
background and current situation somewhat mirrors Kyrgyzstan’s, but rapidly diverges after 
independence.    
23 Liia Tüür and Ülla Kulasalu, “Higher Education in Estonia,” Archimedes Foundation, 
Estonian Academic Recognition Information Centre, 2010. 24 Gwendolyn Sasse, “The Politics of EU Conditionality: The Norm of Minority Protection during and beyond EU Accession” 15, no. 6 (2011): 842–60. 25 Anna Gromilova. 
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Kyrgyzstan was never an independent country prior to 1991. The land that is now modern 
Kyrgyzstan became a part of the Russian empire incrementally throughout the nineteenth century 
with the last portion, southern Kyrgyzstan, being incorporated in 1876.26 During the Russian 
imperial period there was Kyrgyz resistance against Russian occupation including a series of 
uprisings.27 The suppression of a particularly large revolt in 1916 caused an exodus of Kyrgyz 
into China, which resulted in numerous deaths and would become a major point of Kyrgyz 
historical resentment in the modern era.28 Later, Kyrgyzstan was incorporated into the Soviet 
Union after the October Revolution, Bolshevik actions within Central Asia, and a civil war 
within Kyrgyzstan itself.29  
As a Soviet Republic there was a large degree of Russian cultural influence, most notably 
on local languages, which were forced to adopt the Cyrillic alphabet.30 Education in Kyrgyzstan, 
however, was conducted both in Russian and Kyrgyz, but Russian was more professionally 
viable throughout Soviet space and it became the language of choice for interethnic cooperation. 
Kyrgyz as a language, therefore, became somewhat marginalized, having little role in either 
26 Annette Bohr and Simon Crisp, “Kyrgyzstan and the Kyrgyz,” in The Nationalities in the 
Post-Soviet States, ed. Graham Smith, 2nd ed. (Essex, England: Longman, 1996). 
27Annette Bohr and Simon Crisp. 
28 Брюс Панниер and Алиса Вальсамаки, “Столетие Великого Исхода кыргызского 
народа,” Радио Азаттык, 2016, https://rus.azattyq.org/a/kyrgyzstan-urkun-
1916/27709420.html.;Annette Bohr and Simon Crisp.29 Annette Bohr and Simon Crisp. 
30 Laura Katherine Tarbox, “Language and Foreign Policy: The Kyrgyz Experience” (University 
of South Carolina, 2016), 
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir 
=1&article=1087&context=senior_theses. 
11 
government or business.31 There is not, however, any evidence of large scale resistance efforts in 
Kyrgyzstan against Soviet political authority or Russian cultural influence besides growing 
political support for independence in the late 90s under Gorbachev.32  
After independence in 1991, the newly independent Kyrgyz government took steps 
towards granting a position of higher importance to the Kyrgyz language, granting it 
governmental status.33 That being said, in the early 90s the Kyrgyz government took steps to 
prevent Russian-speaking emigration from Kyrgyzstan. The government did not mandate a 
working knowledge of Kyrgyz to gain citizenship in Kyrgyzstan, so Russian-speakers could 
receive citizenship without conditions. In 1994 President Akaev labeled Russian as an official 
language in order to protect its role within Kyrgyz society.34 These steps have generally resulted 
in Russian remaining the language of commerce and education throughout the country. It is also 
still widely used within the government itself with only the President and no other government 
members legally required to speak Kyrgyz.35 
An important consideration, however, is that by 1980 Russians-speakers in Kyrgyzstan 
had lost the preeminent position politically and economically to the faster growing Kyrgyz 
population.36 When independence occurred, therefore, while there were not discriminatory 
practices towards the Russian-speaking minority in terms of citizenship or language, the minority 
31 Annette Bohr and Simon Crisp. 32 Annette Bohr and Simon Crisp. 33 Annette Bohr and Simon Crisp.  34 Annette Bohr and Simon Crisp.   35 Laura Katherine Tarbox. 
36 Michele E. Commercio.
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itself lacked its own economic niche and despite government efforts, began to emigrate in large 
numbers from Kyrgyzstan. 
The poor economic climate seems to be the major cause of Russian-speakers emigrating 
from Kyrgyzstan.37 Other factors may have played a role, however, such as the slight loss of 
status for the Russian language caused by policies that attempted to increase the use of the 
Kyrgyz language.38 Also, the general political instability regarding the two revolutions in 2005 
and 2010, as well as high levels of corruption cannot be ignored as possible factors behind 
emigration.39 Regardless, the current environment for the small Russian-speaking minority is 
generally poor economically, but fairly devoid of discriminatory policies either linguistic or 
political.   
Estonia and Kyrgyzstan have remarkable similarities and differences. They have similar 
although not identical relationships to Russia and the Soviet Union, in that both were unwillingly 
incorporated into the Russian Empire and later became Soviet republics. In being Soviet 
Republics they shared similar political structures and economic climates before independence. 
They also both had significant Russian-speaking minorities. It is important to note that even 
during the Soviet period, they had significant differences, but for the purposes of testing for 
integration, the vital factor is that the major differences in terms of political institutions and 
economic climate began after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This is especially true in their 
37 Annette Bohr and Simon Crisp.
38 Baimatov Bakyt, “The Ethnic Russians- Scattered in Geo-Cultural and Semantic Spaces of 
Kyrgyzstan,” International Journal on Minority and Group Right 21 (2014). ;
Laura Katherine Tarbox. 39 Mathijs Pelkmans, “On Transition and Revolution in Kyrgyzstan,” Focaal 46 (2005).; 
Kathleen Collins, “Kyrygzstan’s Latest Revolution,” Journal of Democracy 22 (2011). ;
“Kyrgyzstan” (Transparency International, n.d.), https://www.transparency.org/country/KGZ. 
13 
governmental approaches to the Russian-speaking minority once they became sovereign and 
independent countries. It is this vital difference and the difference in current economic climate 
that suggest there are significant variances in the degree to which their Russian-speaking 
minorities have integrated.  
14 
4.0  HYPOTHESES 
My hypothesis is that both in Estonia and Kyrgyzstan the Russian-speaking minority has 
integrated, but that the Kyrgyz Russian-speaking minority is more highly integrated. The 
Russian-speaking minority in Kyrgyzstan enjoys a relatively superior political and societal 
position to the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia, but that which in turn enjoys a better 
economic environment. This finding is similar to Commercio’s, but in Estonia rather than Latvia. 
It slightly differs, however, from Laitin’s belief that assimilation in the Baltic States would 
progress over time, but also result in the creation of Russian-speakers with representatives 
fostering nationalistic ideologies that would be counterproductive to integration.40 I do not 
believe that in ether case such ideologies have developed, but instead that integration has 
continued steadily as Laitin suggested it would, but undeterred as he supposed it might be. 
Additionally, I believe that political institutions have the most influence in terms of integration, 
but economic climate dictates emigration levels and through providing economic incentives, can 
offset the effect of discriminatory political institutions, resulting in higher integration levels. 
Examining the quantitative data regarding these variables, however, provides the first step 
towards analyzing this divergence.  
40 David D. Laitin.
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5.0  METHODOLOGY 
This analysis will rely on two sources of data: both qualitative and quantitative. The quantitative 
data is drawn from public opinion survey(s), census data, and economic indicators. These data 
are largely descriptive in nature, but they compliment the second part of the analysis that is 
qualitative. This data will take the form of a comparative case study utilizing passive 
observations and a series of interviews performed in Estonia and Kyrgyzstan. 
I will use a comparative case study using Estonia and Kyrgyzstan to examine integration. 
Often when dealing with a small n study, case studies provide the proper analytical approach to 
test a question41, especially when variables are difficult to precisely codify. Although they lack 
the breadth of large n, quantitative studies, they can produce valid causal inferences. In the case 
of this particular study, the question is what explains variation in integration within Russian-
speaking minorities in the post-Soviet states? Since integration is difficult to quantify and the 
number of cases with significant Russia-speaking minorities is small, a case study is an 
appropriate approach. When data is collected systematically on the same variables across cases 
that are carefully selected to test for those variables, it creates a framework that can test for 
causal relationships.42  
41 Gary King, Robert O Keohane, andSidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 42 Gary King, Robert O Keohane, and Sidney Verba.
16 
Since Estonia and Kyrgyzstan differ dramatically in terms of their political institutions 
and economic environments after independence they provide the necessary conditions to test 
variables concerning the Russian-speaking diaspora, in that they form a most-different systems 
study. John Stuart Mill first described the most-different systems study as the “method of 
difference”. This system means that if the phenomenon under investigation occurs in one case 
but not the other, and if the cases differentiate dramatically on one variable, then that variable is 
most likely the causal variable.43 My hypothesis is that integration of the Russian-speaking 
minorities differs in Estonia and Kyrgyzstan, who differ most significantly in terms of political 
institutions and economic climate in the post-Soviet period. According to the method of 
difference, political institutions and economic climate are sufficient in fostering the difference in 
integration.  
Integration, however, is believed to exist in four different forms. This requires an 
understanding of the theoretical context regarding integration before any analysis can be 
performed. The four dimension of integration, largely agreed on by scholars, are cultural, social, 
structural, and identificational.44 Each dimension deals with certain aspects of how a minority 
population interacts with the dominant culture, society, legal system, or physical space. 
Understanding each dimension is necessary to understand overall integration because while they 
can have high levels of integration within one dimension, they can have low levels within others. 
43 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of 
the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation, vol. 1 (London: Harrison and Co. Printers, 1843). 44 Friedrich Heckman and Dominique Schapper, The Integration of Immigrants in European 
Societies: National Differences and Trends of Convergence (Stuttgart: Lucius and Lucius, 2003). 
17 
Analyzing a minority on each dimension of integration provides a holistic and more precise 
understanding of its position.  
Cultural integration largely concerns how populations, either minority or majority, 
experience shifts in terms of cognitive, behavioral and attitudinal change as different cultures 
interact with each other.45 This could mean that the minority adopts the culture or societal 
tendencies of the majority or that both the majority and the minority shift towards each other. 
This can be seen on two dimensions, either in terms of the adoption of ideals, values, and 
behaviors of the majority society, or in the retention of these aspects of minority society.46 
Within a study, therefore, cultural integration can be measured through religious practices, 
traditions, customs, or in examining titular language proficiency, which in terms of studying the 
Russian-speaking minority within this work, will serve as the main indicator.47 
Social or societal integration involves the degree to which members of distinct 
communities interact with each other physically. This can be most accurately measured in terms 
of segregation in community location, housing, or region.48 Broadly, how often individuals 
within different groups actually interact with each other represents social integration, whose 
indicators include friendships, marriages, and social networks.49 In terms of the Russian-
45 M.A. Gibson, “Immigrant Adaptation and Patterns of Acculturation,” Human Development, no. 44 (2001): 19–23. 46 John W. Berry, “Acculturation: Living Successfully in Two Cultures,” International Journal 
of Intercultural Relations 29, no. 6 (2005): 697–712. 47 J. Allen Williams and T. Suzanne Ortega, “Dimensions of Ethnic Assimilation: An Empirical Appraisal of Gordon’s Typology,” Social Science Quarterly 71, no. 4 (1990): 697–710. 48 Fred J. Jandt, Intercultural Communication: An Introduction (Thousand Oaks, California; London: Sage, 1998). 49 Wolfgang Bosswick and Friedrich Heckman, “Integration of Migrants: Contribution of Local and Regional Authorities” (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2006), 
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speaking minorities, this would concern where the Russian-speaking population predominantly 
lives and whether that area is distinct and separate from titular residency areas. Perceptions and 
personal relations to titular members might also measure Russian-speaking minority social 
integration. 
Structural integration concerns the possession of rights and access to institutions of 
society. These institutions might include the job market, education, housing, pubic goods, 
citizenship, or health care.50 Whether individuals within a minority group have equal access to 
these institutions or have the same possession of rights, indicate the degree of structural 
integration.  In a scenario in which rights and access are not equitably distributed, one can argue 
that the minority has low levels of structural integration.  
There is, however, a caveat to this idea. Instead of access to the main institutions of 
society, if a minority can have access to equivalent institutions within a sub-system51, either 
ethnic or transnational, it can be argued that they can achieve parity in socio-economic life.52 
This is an important distinction to consider, especially in the case of minorities like the Russian-
speaking diaspora, as they could potentially lack equal access to rights or institutions within their 
host country, but still exhibit high levels of structural integration at the community level. 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_files/pubdocs/2006/22/en/1/ef 0622en.pdf. 50 Wolfgang Bosswick and Friedrich Heckman. 51 Friedrich Heckman and Dominique Schapper. 52 Roger Waldinger, “From Ellis Island to LAX: Immigrant Prospects in the American City,” 
International Migration Review 30, no. 4 (1996): 1078–86. 
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Exploring perceptions of socio-economic barriers can serve as an indicator of structural 
integration.  
The final dimension, identificational integration, concerns ethnic and national self-
identification. Specifically, whether individuals identify with their host country, country of 
origin, national group, or a combination of groups.53 In terms of the Russian-speaking diaspora 
this becomes a measure of to what degree individuals identify with Russia, the Russian-speaking 
diaspora, or their titular country. Latin was primarily interested with this dynamic of integration, 
believing that over time Russian-speaking minority members might identify with a diaspora 
community, either within their titular state or broadly throughout the post-Soviet world, more 
than their titular government.  
There is a similar caveat to this approach, however, as there was to structural integration, 
in that is it is possible to identify strongly within one’s community at the local level. High levels 
of identificational integration can be exhibited by perceptions of feeling at home or of being 
accepted by society either at the national or local level.54 This creates an interesting dynamic in 
which minority groups can identify strongly with their host country because they strongly 
identify with their minority community within that country. They can then achieve high levels of 
identificational integration and inadvertently develop positive perceptions of their titular 
government as a whole. This is especially true when their community’s success is dependent on 
the overall country’s success.  
53 W. John Berry, “Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaption” 46, no. 1 (1997): 5–68. 54 Gerli Nimmerfeldt, “The Russian Second Generation in Tallinn and Kohtla-Jarva,” in Sense 
of Belonging to Estonia, ed. Jelena Helemae and Raivo Vetik (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 201–24. 
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I approach integration in these terms, but I use a series of interviews to actually examine 
the levels of integration on each dimension.  I performed these interviews while living in Estonia 
and Kyrgyzstan for 2 and 8 months respectively. Qualitative interviews can describe social and 
political processes that are difficult to quantify, and integration is a perfect example of such a 
process.55 My interviews were semi-structured interviews that formed an elaborated case study 
aimed at exploring how individuals have integrated into either Estonian or Kyrgyz societies.  
I conducted 31 Russian interviews while abroad, 14 in Narva, Estonia and 17 in Bishkek, 
Kyrgyzstan. These interview respondents were from a variety of backgrounds, genders, different 
professions, various ages, and generally from many socioeconomic brackets. Although a small 
sample size, my interview responses were by and far homogenous and therefore I believe I 
reached saturation point even with the small scale in consideration. Their accounts and my 
observations from living in these countries form the backbone of this research.  
In Estonia, many of my respondents were the employees at Narva College, the institution 
where I studied. Many were also host families of other American students. The bulk of my 
participants, therefore, were middle aged or older.  Their professions differed tremendously from 
doctors to secretaries. I also interviewed friends that I had made while in Estonia and 
subsequently their friends, so some of my interviews were with young adults who were just 
beginning higher education or in the process of applying. In general, the majority of my 
respondents were women. In Kyrgyzstan, the bulk of my interviews were from young adults that 
studied at the American University of Central Asia. I interviewed middle-aged respondents who 
were instructors where I studied Russian, people who trained in Jiu-Jitsu at a local dojo, and also 
55 Herbert J Rubin and Irene S Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data (Thousand Oaks, California; London: Sage Publications, 2005). 
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professionals with whom I made connections with through my work at an NGO. In terms of 
gender, both were represented equally.  
Figure 1: Interview Questions 
The interview questions listed above, both in English and Russian, formed the basic 
guide for how I approached each interview I performed. As semi-structured interviews, these 
questions served as a guide. I did not always follow the questions exactly, often expanding on 
certain areas depending on the participant and their reactions to the questions. I paid specific 
attention to not only their responses, but also their body language to see which question 
prompted a larger response or which areas the respondent was uncomfortable to speak about.   
When I began these interviews in Estonia, however, my Russian ability was less 
developed as I was still learning Russian at the intermediate level. I recorded every interview and 
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had to listen to them repeatedly to draw accurate conclusions. Within Bishkek, though my 
Russian had improved and so my interviewing ability itself became more flexible and accurate, 
but I continued to record every interview. 
The beginning of each interview was aimed at exploring demographic information about 
the respondent. Then I explored the languages they speak, to measure cultural integration, before 
examining whether that language affects their life within their host country. As each respondent 
spoke Russian as his or her primary language, this was a means of asking whether being a 
Russian impacted his or her role within society, which would dictate the degree of structural 
integration. From here I began to explore how being a Russian-speakers impacted their life 
politically and economically, again exploring structural integration. After this I switched to 
discuss events in Ukraine and how they and the Russian-speaking community in general perceive 
these events, in order to test for irredentism and diaspora identification, which would measure 
identificational integration. To reinforce this question, I would ask how they saw the Russian 
Federation as a Russian-speaker living outside of Russia itself. Finally, I would explore the 
ethnic dimension within each country, asking if external events have changed how the majority 
sees the Russian-speaking minority, quickly specifying how they see the Estonian majority and 
how generally the two groups interact. These questions regarding ethnic relations test for both 
cultural and social integration.  
While in Estonia I typically just used and followed my interview questions as a template. 
In Kyrgyzstan I additionally tried to ascertain why the respondent or respondent’s family decided 
to remain in Kyrgyzstan despite large levels emigration after independence. I also explored 
whether the increase in the Kyrgyz language’s popularity and generally the tendency towards 
Kyrgyz national identity posed a problem to the Russian-speaking minority. Beyond that, 
23 
however, my methodological approach to these interviews did not change between Estonia and 
Kyrgyzstan. I believe this approach allowed me to explore each type of integration apparent 
within both minority groups. 
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6.0  EVIDENCE AND RESULTS: QUANTITATIVE DATA 
In Estonia, Russian-speakers make up a significant portion of the population according to census 
data.56 With a quarter of the population identifying as Russian-speakers, it would seem that the 
Russian-speaking minority has a degree of influence in terms of voting numbers and is large 
enough to warrant specific attention on the governmental level. 
Figure 2: Population Percentage of Russian-Speakers in Estonia 
Another important indicator is, however, how the Russian-speaking population is 
dispersed throughout the country. This can be examined by measuring where Russian is spoken 
56 “Population and Housing Census” (Estonia Statistics, September 17, 2012), https://www.stat.ee/64310?parent_id=39113. 
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as a primary language.57 This dispersion can be seen in a map of Estonia that demonstrates 
where the Russian language is spoken in terms of percentages of population.58 It is apparent that 
the Russian-speaking population is concentrated within a few areas. Namely, the most 
concentrated area is the Ida-Viru valley county in the Northeast whose capital is Narva, the site 
used for the qualitative research.59 Broadly, however, the Russian-speaking minority is located 
primarily along the borders with the Russian Federation and also along the North. 
Figure 3: Russian-Speaking Areas in Estonia 
Census data60 also demonstrates that the Russian-speaking minority is concentrated 
within urban centers such as Tallinn and Tartu, which is also apparent within the map.  From 
57 Maarten van der Molen, “Country Report Estonia” (Rabo-Research--Economic Research, April 2, 2014), 58 Population and Housing Census.” (Estonia Statistics, September 17, 2012).59 David J. Smith, “Narva Region within Estonian Republic: From Autonomism to Accommodation?,” Regional and Federal Studies, no. 2 (2002): 89.  60 Population and Housing Census.” (Estonia Statistics, September 17, 2012).   
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this, it is evident that the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia is significant in proportion to the 
titular population, but generally concentrated along the periphery of the border.
The Russian language outside of Russian-speaking communities plays a minor role 
within Estonia because the titular population speaks Estonian. Survey data for an integration 
report among Russian-speakers explored the degree to which Russian-speakers speak Estonian.61 
The data is split between age groups, which differ in terms of response, but generally speaking 
the number of Russian-speakers who speak Estonian freely is small. While use and knowledge of 
Estonian is growing amongst the younger generations, a limited to non-existent knowledge of 
Estonia is still common amongst the majority of Russian-speakers.  
Figure 4: Levels of Estonian Knowledge amongst Russian-Speakers 
Citizenship status is another important consideration. The lack of Estonian citizenship 
was a greater issue concerning the Russian-speaking minority immediately after independence, 
61 Raivo Vetik et al., “Estonian Monitoring 2015” (Ministry of Culture, 2015). 
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due to Estonian governmental policy that required Russian-speakers to pass a citizenship exam 
with a stringent Estonian language component. Today, however, even though such requirements 
have loosened and generally citizenship requirements have become less strict, many Russian-
speakers within in Estonia still lack citizenship. As shown in the graph, currently only 85 percent 
of Russian-speakers in Estonia have Estonian citizenship, which is a substantial increase from 
67.8 in 1992.62 
Figure 5: Citizenship within the Russian-Speaking Minority 
Beyond citizenship, it is important to consider how the Russian-speaking minority 
perceives Estonia, Russia, and international organizations. Public opinion surveys performed in 
2014 asked whether both Estonians and Russian-speakers within Estonia would defend their 
62 Raivo Vetik et al., “Estonian Monitoring 2015” (Ministry of Culture, 2015). 
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country in the case of attack by a foreign power.63 Their findings were that 43 percent of 
Estonians would “definitely” put up armed resistance and 43 percent would “probably”.  In 
comparison Russian-speakers responded with 30 percent saying they would “definitely” and 52 
percent with “probably”, signifying a majority of the Russian-speaking population would defend 
their country. An important note is that among older generations of Russian-speakers these 
numbers were dramatically lower.64 
Within this same survey, Estonians and Russian-speakers were asked to list the most 
important relationships that Estonia could have to provide defense. The most common responses 
among Estonians were NATO (78%), developing Estonia’s own military capability (47%), and 
the EU (27%). Russians-speakers’ most common responses were cooperation and good relations 
with Russia (53%), NATO (43%), and developing Estonia’s own military capability (41%). 
Interestingly, 37 percent of Russian-speakers responded that the EU was an important 
relationship, 10 percent higher than Estonians.65 
Another public opinion survey asked Estonians and Russian-speakers to rank their 
feelings of tolerance to each other.66 In this survey 55 percent of Russian-speakers reported that 
they had high tolerance towards Estonians. 40 percent responded that they had average tolerance, 
and only 5 percent responded that they had low tolerance towards Estonians. Only 28 percent of 
Estonians in turn reported that they had high tolerance towards Russian-speakers. Russian-
63 Juhan Kivirahk, “Integrating Estonia’s Russian-Speaking Population: Findings of National Defense Opinion Surveys” (Estonia: International Centre for Defense and Security, 2014), https://www.icds.ee/fileadmin/media/icds.ee/failid/Juhan_Kivirahk__Integrating_Estonia s_Russian-Speaking_Population.pdf. 64 Juhan Kivirahk. 65 Juhan Kivirahk. 66 Kulliki Korts, “Ethnic Attitudes and Contacts Between Ethnic Groups in Estonia,” Journal 
of Baltic Studies 40, no. 1 (2009). 
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speakers, therefore, have on average much higher levels of tolerance towards Estonians than 
Estonians do towards Russian-speakers.67 
Figure 6: Russian-Speakers' Levels of Tolerance towards Estonians 
Figure 7: Estonians' Levels of Tolerance towards Russian-Speakers 
67 Kulliki Korts. 
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Broadly speaking, an interesting environment has developed for the Russian-speaking 
minority within Estonia. The population itself is concentrated in a few specific areas and 
accounts for a quarter of the overall population. Linguistically speaking, the Russian language is 
still predominant within the minority community. While Estonian language usage is growing, it 
is evident that the Russian-speaking minority has created certain linguistic communities 
independent of the Estonian language. In terms of public opinion data, Russian-speakers have 
high opinions of both the EU and Russia, would defend Estonia in case of invasion, and have a 
high tolerance towards Estonians. This dynamic is remarkable to compare with the Russian-
speaking minority within Kyrgyzstan. 
Figure 8: Population Percentage of Russian-Speakers in Kyrgyzstan 
In Kyrgyzstan the Russian-speaking minority size has fallen dramatically since the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and now comprises only a small portion of the overall 
population. Census data shows that only 6.4 percent of the overall population currently identifies 
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as Russian-speaking.68 Russian-speakers are the third largest minority behind Uzbeks, but are not 
a significant portion of the population. Geographically, the minority is concentrated heavily 
within the capital, Bishkek, as opposed to a particular region or throughout the country.69 From 
this evidence it would seem that Russian-speakers and the Russian language are not particularly 
notable within Kyrgyzstan. Examining linguistic preference within the country, however, 
contradicts this conclusion. 
Census data demonstrates that within Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyz is the main language spoken.70 
This is logical considering it is the language of the titular population. The surprising result 
though, is that Russian is spoken by 67 percent of the population. This is a significant portion of 
the population in comparison to the six percent that identifies as Russian-speaking. This suggests 
an entirely different environment from Estonia, with a significantly sized Russian-speaking 
population, but minor role for the Russian language. The Russian-speaking minority in 
Kyrgyzstan may be small and concentrated within one city, but the language itself enjoys 
popular use throughout the country. Already the divergence between these groups can be seen. 
68 Population and Housing Census of the Kyrgyz Republic of 2009” (National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2009), https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/wphc/Kyrgyzstan/A5-2PopulationAndHousingCensusOfTheKyrgyzRepublicOf2009.pdf. 69 “Population and Housing Census of the Kyrgyz Republic of 2009.” 70 Population and Housing Census of the Kyrgyz Republic of 2009.”
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Figure 9: Languages Used in Kyrgyzstan 
Public opinion data within Kyrgyzstan concerning the Russian-speaking minority is rare, 
most probably due to the small size of the population. One study, however, was gathered to 
measure attitudes towards Russia and Russian actions within Crimea.71 Although this study does 
not specify the ethnicity of respondents, it is useful for gauging opinions about the Russian 
Federation broadly and perhaps subsequently, attitudes towards Russians in general. In terms of 
“What the Crimean crisis is?”, 44 percent of respondents view it as the “joining of Crimea to 
Russia as a result of the referendum” and 33 percent see it as the “return of Crimea to the 
motherland”. Only ten percent view it as an annexation. In terms of “how they see Russia’s role 
in the crisis?”, 41 percent responded that Russia was the “defender of the rights of the Crimean 
people” and 21 percent as a “rescuer”. Only six percent viewed Russia as the aggressor, which 
indicates generally high support for Russia. 
71 Kulpunai Barakanova, “The Kyrgyz Media’s Portrayal of the Crimean Crisis and Its Impact on Kyrgyz Public Opinion,” MANAS Journal of Social Studies 4, no. 4 (2015). 
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Another public opinion survey examined how different ethnic groups within Kyrgyzstan 
perceive each other, in terms of how much they found in common with other groups.72 This 
survey found that 40 percent of Russian-speakers believe that have a great deal in common with 
Kyrgyz while 48 percent believe that have a fair amount in common with Kyrgyz. Only six 
percent believed they had little in common with Kyrgyz. Among Kyrgyz respondents, however, 
only 24 percent believed they had a great deal in common with Russian-speakers and 40 believed 
they had a fair amount in common. Finally, 27 percent believed they had little in common with 
Russian-speakers. This asymmetrical relationship suggests that Russian-speakers have a 
favorable opinion of Kyrgyz, but Kyrgyz have a less favorable opinion in turn. 
Figure 10: Russian-Speakers Cultural Commonality with Kyrgyz 
72 Regina Faranda and B. David Nolle, “Boundaries of Ethnic Identity in Central Asia: Titular and Russian Perceptions of Ethnic Commonalities in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,” Ethnic 
and Racial Studies 34, no. 4 (2011). 
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Figure 11: Kyrgyz Cultural Commonality with Russian-Speakers 
I also examine the population trends for both Russian-speaking minorities in both cases 
over time because the immigration and emigration levels since independence are important 
factors. Starting in 1989 and continuing until the most recent censuses, the Russian-speaking 
minority has declined in both Estonia and Kyrgyzstan, but at dramatically different rates.73 
Originally both populations were larger than they are today. Estonia’s Russian-speaking minority 
began at around 30 percent of the population, but dropped during the 90’s to around 25 percent. 
In Kyrgyzstan, however, the population was originally around 20 percent, similar to modern 
Estonia, but has dropped to a little over six percent. This differentiates completely from Estonia. 
73 “Population and Housing Census.” (Estonia Statistics).;   
"Population and Housing Census of the Kyrgyz Republic of 2009.” 
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Figure 12: Russian-Speaking Population Trend 
In Estonia the Russian-speaking population dropped slightly after the dissolution of the 
USSR, but then remained stable. Russian remained a primarily community based language in the 
Russian-speaking community and the minority maintains a sizeable enough presence in 
comparison to the titular population. In Kyrgyzstan though, the Russian-speaking minority 
emigrated from Kyrgyzstan dramatically after 1991 and has consistently declined ever since. 
With a smaller and smaller population, the Russian-speaking minority has become concentrated 
within a single city and lacks significance in comparison to the overall population of Kyrgyzstan. 
The Russian language, however, has retained its position within Kyrgyzstan despite the decline 
of the actual Russian-speaking minority. This trend demonstrates that something occurred to 
cause mass migration from Kyrgyzstan that did not occur within Estonia to the same degree. 
Although population decline and emigration do not necessarily correlate to the current minority 
population’s integration into society, it might be indicative of factors within Kyrgyzstan that are 
unattractive to the Russian-speaking population. 
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The economic climates of both Estonia and Kyrgyzstan might offer an explanation for 
this difference in emigration. I initially use the World Bank’s data on GDP to compare economic 
climates. Estonia’s nearly 23 billion dollar GDP is remarkably higher than Kyrgyzstan’s, which 
is slightly above six billion dollars.74 Of the two countries, Estonia is definitively the wealthier. 
GDP, however, is not always a good indicator of how an economic environment feels to the 
citizenry. GDP per capita can often be a more revealing statistic in terms of the effect of a 
country’s wealth on individuals.75 I also compare the economic environment within the Russian 
Federation as well because the Russian-speaking minority within Estonia lives along the border 
and is aware of the economic climate within Russia. Also, the high level of emigration of 
Russian-speakers from Kyrgyzstan back to Russia suggests that the Russian economy should be 
considered.76  
In terms of GDP per Capita PPP, Estonia has a stronger impact in regard to its economy’s 
effect on its citizenry with a rate of around 18 thousand US dollars.77 The Russian Federation has 
a significantly lower rate, below 10 thousand, having dropped dramatically around 2013. Finally, 
Kyrgyzstan has an incredibly low rate, just below two thousand. Just from this data alone it 
would seem that for the average individual, Estonia offers the best economic environment. 
Russia follows behind Estonia and is ahead of Kyrgyzstan, whose economy is far behind the 
others. Whether the distribution of wealth is equitable is another important distinction.  
74 “Estonia” (World Bank, 2017), https://data.worldbank.org/country/Estonia. 75 Khan Mehreen, “What Does GDP Really Tell Us about Economic Growth?,” The Telegraph, October 15, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11159277/What-does-GDP-really-tell-us-about-economic-growth.html. 76 Michele E. Commercio.77 “GDP per Capita (Current US$)” (World Bank, 2017), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=EE-KG-RU. 
37 
Figure 13: GDP per Capita PPP 
GINI index describes how equitable the distribution of wealth is within a country.78 
Russia has the highest GINI coefficient, meaning that wealth in Russian is less equitably 
distributed than in Estonia or Kyrgyzstan.79 Estonia subsequently has a higher coefficient than 
Kyrgyzstan, which suggests that wealth in Estonia is less equitably distributed than in 
Kyrgyzstan. This might indicate that Russian-speakers in Kyrgyzstan benefit from their economy 
more so than Russian-speakers in Kyrgyzstan. This might be corroborated by fact that high 
paying jobs in Estonia often require a proficient level of Estonian, but the vast majority of 
Russian-speakers do not speak Estonian. In contrast, the majority of people in Kyrgyzstan speak 
Russian and high paying jobs typically only require knowledge of Russian. The large downturn 
in Kyrgyzstan’s GINI coefficient in the late 90’s, however, indicates another variable might 
78Markus Brueckner and Daniel Lederman, “Inequality and GDP per Capita: The Role of Initial Income,” World Bank, no. 2 (2017).  79 “GINI Index (World Bank Estimate)” (World Bank, 2017), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=EE-KG-RU. 
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cause this phenomenon. Regardless, GINI index does not specify whether wealth is equitably 
distributed to minorities, so a more specific analysis is needed.  
Figure 14: GINI Index 
Considering all the quantitative data, the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia differs on 
the dimensions of integration from the Russian-speaking minority in Kyrgyzstan. In terms of 
cultural integration, the low level of Estonian language proficiency indicates low integration. 
Socially, the segregated communities also suggest low integration, although the high degree of 
tolerance amongst the minority population towards Estonians does suggest slightly higher levels. 
In terms of structural integration, the lack of citizenship for some members of the minority 
community indicates low integration, but a more thorough exploration of access to major societal 
institutions is needed. As for identificational, the high percentage of minority members who 
value a cooperative relationship with Russia might suggest identification with Russia, although 
this may not necessarily correlate to low identification levels within Estonia. The fact that more 
Russian-speakers than Estonians value European Union membership and that so many would 
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defend Estonia in case of foreign attack, indicates that a closer analysis of identificational 
integration is needed, especially considering the lack of emigration after independence. The 
effect of the relatively superior economic position also requires a closer analysis. 
In contrast, the Russian-speaking minority in Kyrgyzstan has significantly different levels 
of integration in each dimension. Regarding cultural integration, while the Russian-speaking 
minority has avoided learning the Kyrgyz language, the titular population’s use of Russian still 
suggests high cultural integration. The high perception of commonality with Kyrgyz also 
increases this effect. It also demonstrates high social integration, which is strengthened by the 
fact that Russian-speakers live alongside Kyrgyz within Bishkek and not within segregated 
communities. Regarding structural integration, all Russian-speakers in Kyrgyzstan have 
citizenship, but further analysis is needed before any conclusion can be reached.  In terms of 
identificational integration, it is difficult to say from the data available, but high levels of 
emigration suggest a strong preference for other national residencies. This tendency, however, 
does not describe the remaining minority population. High levels of support for the Russian 
Federation, support for Russian actions in Crimea, and high levels of Russian language usage 
outside of the Russian-speaking minority, however, suggests Kyrgyzstan is accommodating of 
Russian-speakers. The effect of the relatively inferior economic position in comparison to 
Russia, however, necessitates further examination. 
To help explore causal mechanisms and to understand why integration is higher in 
Kyrgyzstan, I will rely on my original qualitative data. These reinforce the quantitative findings 
and explore the effect of economic climate on the various dimensions of integration. They also 
explore the implications suggested by the descriptive statistics and allow for greater exploration 
into areas that the quantitative data was unable to properly analyze. 
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7.0  EVIDENCE AND RESULTS: QUALITATIVE DATA 
7.1 ESTONIA: INTERVIEWS AND RESULTS 
In terms of demographics, the vast majority of all respondents were middle-aged with some 
young adults. Almost all were the second generation of their family to be in Estonia, with their 
parents having moved sometime during the Soviet Union, which is consistent with the overall 
trend of Russian-speaker’s migration to Estonia during that period. Some respondents claimed 
their families had been in Estonia since the start of the century, but they were by far the minority. 
Every respondent had family in Russia currently, either who had always been there or who had 
chosen to move back to Russia after 1991. In asking why their family decided to stay in Estonia 
after 1991, every respondent said they did so because either they or their parents had jobs in 
Estonia that they wanted to keep.  
The majority of my respondents had an Estonian passport. A few had Russian passports 
and only one had an “Alien’s” passport without citizenship. Notably, however, some of the 
respondents with an Estonian passport also had a Russian passport, which is technically illegal 
but simplifies the process of crossing over to Ivangorod. Generally, respondents with Estonian 
passports were pleased to have them because of the access they received to Europe and around 
the world. Ironically, however, the one person I interviewed with an Alien’s passport and the few 
with illegal dual passports, were happy because they had access to everything from Vladivostok 
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to Portugal. As one respondent with both an Estonian and Russian passport put it, “It’s nice to 
travel freely within Europe. For example, my friends and I are going to Germany soon. But 
whenever I want to visit my grandmother and family in Russia I can do that without problems. 
Its very convenient”.80 This demonstrates the practicality of having both passports, a similar 
practicality to having an Alien’s passport. Respondents with dual passport or an Alien’s passport 
were by far the minority in comparison to Estonian passport holders, but ironically this minority 
might actually benefit more than the majority in terms of travel options.  
Linguistically, each respondent spoke Russian as his or her primary language both at 
home and in the community. Since Russian is the primary means of communication, this was not 
surprising. Whether the individual spoke Estonian, however, differed on a case-by-case basis. 
Every respondent besides one said they spoke some Estonian, but what “some” meant varied 
from near fluency to knowing a few words. The main tendency I noticed was that the knowledge 
of Estonian depended highly on age and professional goals. Older Russian-speakers within 
Estonia typically spoke little to no Estonian. This was because they had had little interaction with 
Estonians and their jobs did not require any knowledge of Estonian. Also, the majority of their 
lives within Estonia were during the Soviet Union and so they were not required to learn 
Estonian while in school. Younger generations, however, spoke more Estonian because Estonian 
is more common in the education process within Estonian schools today. That being said, 
younger generation Russian-speakers are typically more multi-lingual in general. When I asked 
one respondent what language she and her children spoke she replied, “{I speak} Russian, 
80 Interview #11-Estonia 
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although my son speaks another four languages, my daughter five, and my second daughter an 
additional three.”81  
Generally speaking, the predominant opinion of my respondents was that Russian, 
Estonian, and English were the most important languages to be successful in Estonia, but the 
order of that importance depended on the individual. Russian-speakers who were interested in 
working in or living in non-Russian speaking areas in Estonia saw Estonian as a necessity, which 
is true for work within the public sector. This is especially true of Russian-speakers who wanted 
to pursue higher education within Estonia, which is instructed in Estonian. Interestingly, some 
younger Russian-speakers were uninterested in learning Estonian because they wanted to go to 
college within the Russian Federation and therefore saw no advantage to learning Estonian. 
Some respondents believed that English was the most useful language after Russian because 
Estonia is mostly bi-lingual between English and Estonian. Also, English opens more doors 
professionally and academically in other European countries, whereas Estonian has a small 
speaking population in comparison. As one respondent put it, when asked which languages are 
important for success in Estonia, “Russian because it is our native language, but also English and 
either German or French. <…> if you live here though, Estonian is important, but if you don’t 
live here, it’s not necessary.”82 Each respondent saw Russian as important for living in Narva, 
communicating with family, and key to their identity as a Russian-speaker. Whether they saw 
another language as useful depended on their personal professional and academic goals.  
In terms of economic barriers my respondents did not see any overt discrimination 
against them specifically because they were Russian-speaking, which differentiates from Latin’s 
81 Interview #4-Estonia  82 Interview #5- Estonia 
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results in the early 90s.83 Much like with regards to linguistic preferences, they were aware that 
the languages they chose dictated where and to what degree they could find work and be 
successful. One respondent believed that English and German were the most important 
languages for success in general, but when I asked if there are opportunities for people who only 
speak Russian within Estonia specifically, she said, “Not very many. With just Russian you can 
find simple work in Narva, but for higher positions it would be difficult. Often there’s a necessity 
for Estonian.”84 It is important to mention here, however, that Narva is considerably less 
developed than either Tallinn or Tartu, the other two largest cities in Estonia. Narva is 
predominantly comprised of old Soviet architecture and the city in general feels completely 
distinct from the rest of the country, as if it does not receive an equitable portion of Estonia’s 
economic wealth.85 Not one respondent, however, saw major economic barriers to their lives 
specifically because of their minority status. They understand that the Russian language was only 
a viable professional language within Narva and that on average work was harder to find in 
Narva than in the rest of Estonia.  
This response changes somewhat in regards to political barriers, which were brought up 
much less. Respondents were aware of anti-Russian policies adopted by the Estonian 
government, especially citizenship policies in the past, but few were particularly concerned. 
Some were frustrated at the lack of Russian-speaking members of government, believing it not 
be proportional to the percentage of Estonia’s population that is Russian-speaking. Generally, 
few respondents had political grievances within Estonia. An issue that respondents did bring up 
83 David D. Laitin. 84 Interview #9-Estonia  85 This is largely my personal observation from being in Narva and travelling to other Estonian cities. 
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though, was the use of Estonian for political speeches and addresses within Narva. I witnessed 
this myself when several Russian-speakers heckled the Mayor of Narva during Ivana Kupala 
day, a local holiday, for speaking in Estonian to address the crowd. 
Mayor: *addressing the crowd in Estonian.  
Russian man: “Мы Русские! Мы Русские! По-русский говорить! (We are Russian! We 
are Russian! Speak in Russian!) 
Mayor: *switches address into Russian. 86 
Besides this, most of my respondents did not see political barriers as an issue because at the local 
level they did not perceive political or linguistic discrimination. From these findings I began to 
notice an interesting concept develop: Narva was separate from Estonia.  
I first noticed this trend when I was speaking to some Russian-speaking friends about 
going to Tallinn. They responded, laughing, that I “was going to Estonia.”87 The citizenry of 
Narva overwhelmingly identifies more strongly with Narva and than with Estonia. They are 
seemingly comfortable with disassociating their local community from Estonia and the Russian 
Federation both. Their unique position as a Russian-speaking community within Estonia, but 
separate from Russia, has created a populace who define themselves in similar terms.  
This local identification is important for discussing how respondents relate to actions in 
Ukraine and overall to the Federation.  Surprisingly, only one respondent felt passionate about 
the civil war in Ukraine. He loudly extolled his support for the annexation of Crimea and Putin: 
86 Ivan Kupala Day recorded occurrence 87 Conversation I had with friends  
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I absolutely support what Putin did in Crimea. Absolutely… practically the entire 
Russian speaking population in Narva is for Putin, who is a hero, simply a hero. Where 
there is Putin, there is victory. This is a fact. I admire Putin and I believe that if Estonia 
had a leader like Putin we would already be living as if we were in Switzerland. 88 
Contrary to his opinion, every other respondent either simply recognized the complexity 
of the situation or was completely apathetic to it. One interesting response I received was 
“Ukraine is Ukraine but Narva is Narva”.89 Another, more detailed response was simply, “Has it 
influenced the minority here? Yes, everyone has an opinion. Some say this is right. Others say 
something else is right. Or that this is good, no this is good. Creating a balance in viewpoint is 
difficult and politics are always complicated.”90 These two quotes seemingly sum up the 
predominant opinions, which is either that events in Ukraine has little to no impact on Narva or 
that the issue is simply a complicated political issue on which Narva does not have a 
homogenous view. The apathetic response was more common among younger respondents who 
seemed almost entirely apathetic, whereas older respondents would often acknowledge the 
complexity, but not give an opinion on which side they supported. I see this reaction as a 
consequence of Narva self-identifying at the local level, as opposed to with the Russian diaspora 
or Russia broadly.  
This becomes even more apparent when I explored the relationship people had to the 
Russian Federation. Again only one respondent, the same pro-Putin respondent, spoke 
88 Interview #6- Estonia 89 Interview #7-Estonia 90 Interview #10- Estonia 
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passionately about his love for and identification with the Russian Federation. All others had 
very nuanced relationships with Russia. As self-identifying Russians, each saw Russia as 
important to them. It was where their family was from, where their family currently lives, and 
generally their “родина” or homeland, which does not necessarily denote political identification. 
Beyond that, however, my respondents preferred being Russian-speakers in Estonia to being 
Russians in Russia. Often they felt that identifying as Russian culturally was enough, but because 
the economy in Estonia was much better and the opportunities through the EU more plentiful, it 
was beneficial to be an Estonian Russian, or Baltic Russians. One respondent was just happy that 
he could walk to Ivangorod, the Russian city across the bridge, to buy cigarettes, saying 
humorously, “They {cigarettes} are much cheaper there, so I go over once a weak to buy a few 
cartons. Therefore I like Russia.”91   
An important point here is that Russian-speakers within Narva are aware of the poorer 
economic conditions within Ivangorod.92 Considering the fluidity of the border, they can and 
often do travel to their neighbor city within the Federation. They see first hand how beneficial 
living in Estonia is in an economic sense. My interview respondents generally reinforced the fact 
that Russian-speakers in Narva are content to be just that: Narvan Russians. They have little 
desire to live in Russia, but also have little desire to identify specifically as Estonian, content to 
identify with both to separate degrees. As one respondent said: 
91 Interview #2- Estonia 92 Andrew Higgins, “Two Border Cities Share Russian History—and a Sharp European Divide,” New York Times, November 9, 2017. 
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Russia is my homeland. It’s where I was born and it’s a beautiful country. I can say little 
negative about it. Estonia is my second homeland. I live here now and my children are 
Estonian (citizens). So this is my home, while Russia is my homeland.93  
In the final portion of my interview I attempted to learn how my respondents viewed the 
Estonian majority and generally how they would categorize the relationship between the two 
groups. This tended to follow the along same lines as previous explorations. No one explicitly 
had issues with Estonians and some had a few Estonian friends or even Estonian family with 
whom they interacted regularly. As for the overall characterization, the common response was 
that the two groups had little in the form of a relationship, but that what relationship exists is 
positive. One response was “I have many Estonian acquaintances. My relationship to them is 
very respectful. They are wonderful people. <…> Russians understand Estonians and Estonians 
understand Russians.”94 While not necessarily very positive, this statement demonstrates that the 
relationship between the two groups is more positive than negative. This again reinforces my 
previous findings of local identification. Russian-speakers within Estonia have no issue with 
Estonians, but simply do not interact with them frequently. The communities, both Estonian and 
Russian-speaking, are fairly separate, at least from the perspective of the Russian-speaking 
minority in Narva. This separation allows the Russian-speaking minority to somewhat disregard 
the Estonian majority, seeing no reason to have strong opinions about those who have little to no 
impact on their lives or community as a whole.  
93 Interview #10- Estonia 94 Interview #6- Estonia  
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These were the general tendencies that I found throughout my interviews in Estonia. I 
believe that these tendencies are notable and help describe the integration of the Russian-
speaking minority within Estonia. Admittedly because I only performed research within Narva, 
these finding may differ from those Russian-speakers living in Tallinn or Tartu. Since the 
majority of the Russian-speaking minority lives within Narva or the surrounding area, however, I 
believe my findings are an accurate portrayal of the minority as a whole. These findings seem to 
corroborate the large-scale quantitative findings at least in terms of demographics. Most Russian-
speakers came to Narva during the Soviet period, some still do not have Estonian citizenship, 
and some stateless citizens still exist.  
Specifically examining the effect of political institutions and economic climate on Narva 
reveals interesting trends. Generally, Narvans feel comfortable within the Estonian economy and 
do not see any overt discrimination in terms of wealth distribution, although it is simply a visible 
fact that Narva is less developed as a city than other cities. In terms of politics, Narvans are 
aware of discriminatory tendencies on the national scale, specifically earlier citizenship policies, 
and critical of some Estonian governmental policies on the local level, but overall are content 
within their community. Linguistically, the Russian-speaking population has continued to use 
Russian as their primary language, but choose other languages to learn depending on their 
personal goals and ambitions, thereby preventing any specific resentment of linguistic policy.  
In terms of how they relate to external events in Ukraine and the Federation, they are for 
the most part indifferent. In fact, this local identification and general indifference to both Estonia 
as a whole but also Russia, is an important characteristic. They are typically indifferent to 
Ukraine and Crimea because they do not identify with the larger Russian-speaking diaspora or 
choose not to take a specific side. They see Russia as important culturally to their identification 
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and often important because they have family in the Federation, but prefer to be in Estonia due to 
the better economy or their familial connections. In terms of politics, economics, and 
international relations the Russian-speaking minority in Narva is content to identify locally, 
receiving the benefits of their unique position. Any detrimental aspects such as weaker economic 
situation in comparison to the Estonian majority, they see as solvable through studying English 
or German.  
One cannot classify this minority as a highly integrated community because it sees itself 
as distinct and separate, which geographically speaking is true. Even in terms of ethnic relations, 
a slightly positive but largely apathetic relationship to the Estonian majority is the most common 
perception. The Russian-speaking minority within Estonia, therefore, has not integrated well in   
terms of cultural or social integration. This does not, however, mean that it is dissatisfied in 
Estonia. The minority is absolutely content to be distinct from, but still a part of Estonia. I found 
little political and economic resentment, linguistic frustrations, or any sense of irredentism in my 
research. This speaks to high levels of structural and identificational integration, although at the 
community level. The effect this has on attitudes towards Estonia, however, is still positive.  This 
is interesting to Comparing another Russian-speaking minority in a country with different 
political institutions and a different economic climate better isolates the effect these variables 
have on integration. 
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7.2 KYRGYZSTAN: INTERVIEWS AND RESULTS 
In terms of demographics every one of my respondents was at least a third generation citizen of 
Kyrgyzstan and split between young adults and middle aged. Some of their families had been in 
Kyrgyzstan since the beginning of the colonial period while others had moved to Kyrgyzstan 
during the existence of the Soviet Union, but unlike in Estonia, there was no overwhelming trend 
of immigration during a specific time. In terms of citizenship, every respondent was a Kyrgyz 
citizen, which is logical considering the lack of barriers to receiving citizenship for Russian-
speakers following independence in 1991. My respondents typically had family within Russia 
and could visit them easily because of the relaxed passport restrictions for Kyrgyz citizens who 
want to travel to the Russian Federation 
Linguistically, every respondent used Russian as his or her primary language. Few had 
any command of the Kyrgyz language greater than a basic knowledge. This is despite the fact 
that every respondent admitted to studying Kyrgyz for a few years while in school. Typically 
respondents explained this by stating that Kyrgyz is simply not a useful language for them in 
Kyrgyzstan, which is consistent with other research.95 When I asked one respondent if she spoke 
Kyrgyz she laughed out loud and then said, “No. I understand Kyrgyz but do not speak. <…> In 
Bishkek typically Russian do not speak Kyrgyz because it is unnecessary. All people speak 
Russian here.”96 Since Russian-speakers live in Bishkek there are rarely instances where other 
people, regardless of ethnicity, do not speak Russian fluently. Although the surrounding areas 
and rural areas of Kyrgyzstan predominantly speak Kyrgyz, for the Russian-speaking minority 
95 Siarl Ferdinand and Flora Komlosi, “Vitality of the Kyrgyz Language in Bishkek,” 
International Journal of Russian Studies, no. 5 (2016). 96 Interview #14-Kyrgyzstan  
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located within Bishkek, Kyrgyz simply has little use. In fact, many respondents replied 
humorously as to whether they spoke Kyrgyz, joking how despite learning it in school they have 
forgotten all but simple phrases. Within Bishkek, therefore, it is obvious both from my own 
experiences and my respondents’ that Russian is the most useful language.  
When specifically asked which languages are necessary to be successful in Kyrgyzstan, 
every respondent responded with Russian as his or her first choice. Typically, English was the 
second language listed, due to the inherent benefits to learning the most popular global language, 
which has grown in popularity within Bishkek as well, especially among younger generations. 
Kyrgyz was listed only in the context of government work. When I asked one respondent which 
language was the most useful to be successful in Kyrgyzstan he said “English and Russian”, but 
after I asked about Kyrgyz he said: 
If you want to work in the government, then yes, but because of globalization English is 
the more useful language. If you speak Kyrgyz you can be successful in Kyrgyzstan, but 
you can do that with Russian too. If you speak English, the whole world opens to you. 97 
This respondent, much like every respondent, believed that Kyrgyz was beneficial for 
government work and so they agreed that people interested in that area should learn Kyrgyz. This 
was especially true and logical among my respondents who worked within the government, as 
they reportedly repeatedly took tests to prove they had a rudimentary knowledge of Kyrgyz. 
They too, however, agreed that the language had little practical use outside of this area. Higher 
education, upper level jobs, and practically any other position within Kyrgyzstan could be 
97 Interview #10-Kyrgyzstan 
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obtained with only Russian. Also because Russian remains a main language of communication 
throughout Central Asia, it has largely retained its position. An interesting dynamic is that 
Russian is still only spoken in major cities, but this is generally accepted because the Russian-
speaking minority has no interest in living within rural Kyrgyzstan or if they do, they visit family 
within Russian-speaking dominated villages. As one respondent put it though, “in the country 
people know Russian poorly so Kyrgyz is needed, but not in Bishkek where most Russians 
are.”98 
An important difference in my interviews in Kyrgyzstan from my interviews in Estonia 
was that I did not have a single respondent report that they saw any economic or political 
discrimination against the Russian-speaking minority. Some were frustrated with the high levels 
of corruption perceived within the government and generally worried about low levels of 
economic growth, but this is hardly unique to the minority and is true for any citizen of 
Kyrgyzstan. One respondent summed up the general opinion in her response to whether speaking 
Russian was sufficient to live in Kyrgyzstan by saying, “My parents are Russian and only speak 
Russian. They live normally here and work normally here. There are no problems for them.”99 
Whether or not opportunities have changed for the Russian-speaking minority over time, 
there was some difference in responses. This was mostly due to a generational divide, however, 
as younger respondents seemed more optimistic about the current climate and culture. For 
example, one younger respondent who stated:  
98 Interview #15- Kyrgyzstan 99 Interview #9- Kyrgyzstan  
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During the Soviet Union, for example, in 1994, things were far less open. Today, 
everything is more open, so there are more foreign products and interactions with foreign 
companies.  So, in general, more opportunities are available.100 
Contrary to this, older generations typically spoke about how there are less public goods 
available now than when they lived in the Soviet Union. This would be consistent with 
generational tendencies broadly, since older generations would have experienced far more in 
terms of public goods when Kyrgyzstan was a Soviet Republic and younger generations would 
have little concept of that period. Interestingly, older respondents typically talked about how 
pretty Bishkek used to be, such as one elderly respondent who said, “Bishkek used to be the 
greenest city in the Soviet Union. After the Soviet Union though, all the trees were cut down.”101 
During the Soviet period, Bishkek was considered very beautiful because of the pure air, 
mountain views, and many green trees throughout the city. After independence, however, many 
trees were cut down, factories polluted the air, hiding the mountain views, and the city itself 
became one of the dirtiest and most polluted cities in the world.102  It is obvious that things have 
changed since independence, but for those Russian-speakers who have stayed in Kyrgyzstan this 
change did not convince them to emigrate.  
I focused a portion of my interviews in Kyrgyzstan on why each respondent or their 
family decided to remain within Kyrgyzstan when so many others decided to leave, especially 
considering the polluted city and poor economic climate. The responses were varied, ranging 
100 Interview #5- Kyrgyzstan  101 Interview #6- Kyrgyzstan  
102 “Bishkek among the World’s 30 Most Polluted Cities,” Times of Central Asia, July 30, 2013, 
https://www.timesca.com/index.php/news/11714-bishkek-among-the-worlds-30-most-polluted-
cities. 
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from, “we were simply located here after independence, so why should we have left?”103 to “my 
mother didn’t want to leave. She hates travelling and loved her Дача (summer home) here.”104 
Generally speaking, the latter response or variations of the latter response were the more 
common. In terms of identification, Russians-speaking in Kyrgyzstan typically identify as 
citizens of Kyrgyzstan, ethnically and culturally Russian, but definitively as natives of 
Kyrgyzstan. They consider Kyrgyzstan, not Russia, their home because their family has typically 
been within the country for multiple generations. While some responded that they remained in 
Kyrgyzstan for economic reasons, because either they or a family member had to stay for a job, 
this was by far less common response in comparison to the typical response that they wanted to 
stay in their home.  
I saw this in their responses to my questions regarding Russia and Ukraine as well. 
Unsurprisingly, Russia played an important role for most respondents, but only in terms of 
cultural identity. As Russian-speakers they supported and liked the Russian Federation in the 
abstract. Few, however, stressed anything more and, unlike in Estonia, I did not interview 
anyone particularly passionate about Putin or Russia. One respondent simply said, “Russians are 
all different. We all came from Russia, but today we are everywhere and not alike at all.”105 
Regarding Crimea and Ukraine, the response was far more disparate than in Estonia, but I 
noticed some tendencies in Kyrgyzstan that I had also seen in Estonia. Again, a popular attitude 
was general indifference towards Ukraine and Crimea, as many saw themselves as entirely 
unconnected to the events. I received one response in particular that was incredibly similar to a 
response I had received in Estonia, “Ukraine is there, but Kyrgyzstan is here”. She continued by 
103 Interview #13- Kyrgyzstan 104 Interview #8- Kyrgyzstan  105 Interview #12- Kyrgyzstan 
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saying, “When I was abroad in Turkey this subject was discussed more. You see, Ukraine is far 
way from here so there is little relationship to Ukraine.”106  
Indifference, however, only accounted for around a third of the responses. After apathy, 
the responses typically trended in one of three directions: either pro-Ukraine, pro-Russia, or saw 
merit in both sides. An important note here is that while my respondents identify as Russian-
speakers, few are entirely ethnically Russian. Many Russian-speakers in Kyrgyzstan are 
Ukrainian descendants or descendants from other former Soviet Republics as well. In fact, many 
of my respondents had Ukrainian family and Russian family members living in each respective 
country. Some respondents, therefore, were critical of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, seeing it 
as an overreach and illegal move into sovereign Ukrainian territory. Others believed that Russia 
had the right to interfere in Crimea, although were typically hesitant to say whether they 
supported separatists in the Ukrainian civil war. Many, however, were simply personally split on 
the issue because of their family ties to both countries. One respondent summarized the situation 
particularly aptly in saying:  
The Russian minority is obviously aware of the events in Ukraine and Crimea. Everyone 
talks about it and finds it interesting, but different people have family either in Russia, in 
Ukraine, or in both. There isn’t one opinion or a common opinion within our 
community. That depends completely on the person. Did it affect us? No I do not think it 
affected us at all or our relationships. 107 
106 Interview #8- Kyrgyzstan 107 Interview #2- Kyrgyzstan 
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I think this accurately describes the Russian-speaking minority’s relationship to Ukraine and 
Crimea in Kyrgyzstan. The community of Russian-speakers is simply too disparate to have any 
homogenous attitude towards these events.  
The final portion of my interview process was to see how my respondents saw the 
Kyrgyz titular population personally and how they generally characterized relations between the 
two groups. Not one respondent had issues with Kyrgyz personally and many stated that they had 
Kyrgyz friends and colleagues. While I lived in Bishkek, I had noticed that it was rare to see 
Russians-speakers and Kyrgyz socializing together public. When I brought this up in interviews 
most respondents agreed that relationships between Russian-speakers and Kyrgyz are usually 
within the workplace, but some assured me they socialized with Kyrgyz friends outside of work. 
As one person responded, “There is no conflict between Russian-speaking and Kyrgyz. It is very 
common for them to be friends and work together. Just in my life, I personally work with and 
have formed friendships with many Kyrgyz.”108 No respondents characterized the 
relationship as anything other than positive.  
There were, however, two stipulations I noticed in this response. One, while every 
respondent saw the overall relationship as positive, there was a tendency among a majority of my 
respondents to somewhat look down on the Kyrgyz. Often I was told that Russian-speakers and 
Kyrgyz are simply “different” and this was because of “менталитет”, which translates to 
mentality in English, but in the context of my interviews has a slightly more nuanced meaning.  
In one interview I was told that, “there is a huge difference in mentality between Russians and 
108 Interview #8- Kyrgyzstan 
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Kyrgyz. I have Kyrgyz friend who had a great job abroad, but returned because her mom said 
she should. This is common for Kyrgyz and I do not understand this mentality.”109  
When I inquired how the “mentalities” are different, my respondents typically pointed to 
the tribal structure or traditional practices of the Kyrgyz, such as bride kidnapping, as evidence 
of the differences of Kyrgyz society to Russian society. I saw this as slightly disparaging, a 
reaction reinforced by a conversation with my teacher who I had previously interviewed. She 
blatantly stated that Kyrgyz have a “низкий менталитет”, or lower mentality than Russian-
speakers. When I explored what she meant by this, she said, “the Kyrgyz have many traditions 
that make little sense to Russians. Tribes, {bride} kidnappings, different customs, which are odd 
in the modern world. They think these are important, but in my opinion, they are… well how to 
say… silly.”110 I noticed this tendency to see Kyrgyz as slightly beneath Russian-speakers in the 
majority of my interviews, although it was often slight. It did not, however, result in any specific 
individual classifying the relationship between Russian-speakers and Kyrgyz relationship as 
poor.111  
It might, however, affect the second stipulation I noticed, which was a general concern 
with the growth of the Kyrgyz language. Kyrgyz as a language is generally considered less 
useful among the Russian-speaking minority, and considering the slight sense of superiority 
among some of my respondents, it is easy to see the Kyrgyz language held with a degree of scorn 
amongst Russian-speakers. As mentioned earlier, my respondents often told me that Kyrgyz as a 
109 Interview #8- Kyrgyzstan  110 Conversation with my teacher. I asked permission write down her comments after this conversation and she agreed as I had already interviewed her before. 111 While I did not interview Kyrgyz during my project, in speaking with Kyrgyz, I found a tendency to dislike ethnic Russians, typically because of historical actions during the colonial period. Within Kyrgyzstan it seems perceptions of ethnic groups is asymmetrical.  
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language has become far more common since five or ten years ago. My respondents told me that 
there is a growth of a Kyrgyz ethnic identity and subsequently a new wave of ethnic nationalism, 
which they see as responsible for the increase in the Kyrgyz language’s popularity in Bishkek.  
My respondents were generally worried that this trend might marginalize the Russian 
language’s role in Kyrgyzstan in the future. One respondent in particular said, “I think many 
more Russians will leave in the future, especially if Kyrgyz continues to become more popular 
and Russian harder to live with.”112 Her speculation was, however, unique to her. Other 
respondents were unconcerned with the growth of Kyrgyz, interestingly often because Kyrgyz 
has become so Russified that it is, supposedly, not difficult to learn for Russian-speakers. One 
respondent said explicitly, “Kyrgyz has accepted so many Russian words that today, even if you 
do not know any Kyrgyz and only speak Russian, when listening to someone speak you could 
understand them. Every 2 or three words can be Russian.”113 Despite this particular opinion, 
however, the main trend I noticed in my interviews was that the Russian-speaking minority is 
aware of the Kyrgyz language’s growth and moderately concerned that the Russian language will 
lose its position within the country.  
I believe that the tendencies I have noted in my interviews describe the Russian-speaking 
minority within Kyrgyzstan and the environment in which they live. I only interviewed within 
Bishkek, which is where the vast majority of Russian-speakers live, but there are Russian-
speaking villages throughout the country and a large population in Osh, the major southern city. 
My interviews, therefore, account for the majority of the population, but might not accurately 
112 Interview #1- Kyrgyzstan  113 Interview# 15 –Kyrgyzstan 
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describe Russian-speakers living in other locations. Despite this, I believe my research accurately 
accounts for the predominant opinion of the Russian-speaking minority.  
I agree with previous scholars who see the emigration from Kyrgyzstan as primarily 
economically motivated, with a small degree of influence from the slight marginalization of the 
Russian language since independence. Considering the current minority, it is evident that 
Russian-speakers in Kyrgyzstan enjoy a relatively unthreatened position. There are no particular 
economic or political barriers facing Russian-speakers in Kyrgyzstan. Any economic issues are 
due to the poor economic climate in general, as opposed to anything specifically aimed at them. 
Linguistically, Russian has retained its role and importance within Kyrgyzstan and even today it 
is possible to be successful in Kyrgyzstan only speaking Russian. There might be some 
limitations, however, in terms of government work. Finally, in terms of personal relationships to 
Russia or events in Ukraine, the Russian-speaking minority considers itself as Kyrgyz citizens 
not Russian and so has not developed a predominant opinion on the issue, often due to the 
existence of both Ukrainian and Russian family ties. This all demonstrates that this particular 
portion of the Russian-speaking diaspora has highly integrated into its host country. 
In terms of identificational integration, the Russian-speaking minority in Kyrgyzstan is 
relatively well integrated, as they typically see themselves as Kyrgyz citizens and subsequently 
Kyrgyzstan as their home. The lack of political or economic barriers demonstrates high structural 
integration. The fact that the Russian-speaking minority’s perception of the Kyrgyz majority is 
positive and that the two coexist within the same space suggests high social integration as well. 
Even in terms of cultural integration, while the Russian-speaking minority has failed to adopt 
Kyrgyz culture or the Kyrgyz language, because the Kyrgyz government and majority population 
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have been accommodating of the Russian language and culture, there is still a high degree of 
cultural integration.  
These factors in combination describe an overall well-integrated minority, but this might 
be because the vast majority of the population already left the country, which has left only the 
most integrated or amenable to integration. The trend towards a Kyrgyz ethnic nationalism, 
however, has already begun to worry certain individuals and could threaten the cultural, 
structural, and identificational integration of the minority population. The integration achieved 
by the Russian-speaking minority in Kyrgyzstan is generally a consequence of the favorable 
position that Russian-speakers enjoy in Kyrgyzstan, a country that has tried to retain Russian 
culture and the Russian language because of its geopolitical reliance on the Russian Federation. 
If this favorable position were to change, however, the degree of integration could also change. 
Considering that the precedent for mass emigration is already in place, this could prove an 
incentive for further departure from Kyrgyzstan.  
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8.0  CONCLUSIONS 
There are several conclusions from this research. The originally harsher approach that the 
Estonian government took towards the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia resulted in local 
identification, but almost paradoxically high levels of structural and identificational integration. 
Russian-speakers in Estonian are overwhelmingly willing to identify as “Baltic Russians” or 
Narvans. While there are incredibly low levels of cultural and societal integration, any potential 
large-scale emigration or pro-Russian tendencies have been limited due to an overall superior 
economic climate, which has also incentivized higher levels of integration. Meanwhile, the more 
accommodating policies taken by the Kyrgyz government have resulted in a highly integrated 
Russian-speaking minority, in every dimension of integration, but the economic climate resulted 
in the vast majority of the minority to emigrate from Kyrgyzstan. The remaining population, 
however, is highly integrated, even more so than the Estonian Russian-speaking minority.  
I believe that it is highly unlikely, therefore, that Russian Federation could use either 
Russian-speaking minority as geopolitical tools. Similarly, I do not believe that Russian-speakers 
in Estonia or Kyrgyzstan will be a “fifth column,” because of the level of integration achieved by 
both minority groups. Although this integration differs, in both cases it is sufficiently high that 
both groups identify strongly with their host countries and not either with a “Russian-speaking 
diaspora” or with the Russian Federation itself. Considering Brubacker’s model of the 
relationship that Russian-speaking populations have to the Russian Federation and their host 
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countries, within my cases both minority populations identify strongly with their host countries. 
This mitigates the influence that Russia as an external homeland has on the two minority groups 
as they fail to strongly identify with Russia. It is interesting to note that the Russian Federation 
has rarely actively involved itself with the Russian-speaking populations in either Estonia or 
Kyrgyzstan. This may be because it recognizes that it lacks a strong relationship to either 
minority group or, because it failed to see a strategic advantage in maintaining the relationship, it 
decided to not involve itself.  
My study also has implications concerning the theory behind integration broadly. It is 
evident that the Russian-speaking minorities of Estonia and Kyrgyzstan have achieved different 
levels of integration. Considering the “method of difference”, this suggests that the main 
difference between the two cases, the political institutions and economic climate after 
independence, has caused this variance in integration. I found, therefore, that political institutions 
dictate the level of integration, but economic climate is the deciding factor behind emigration 
and can also influence integration to a degree. A superior economic climate can mitigate the 
effect of discriminatory political practices and incentivize identification with a host country.    
Looking to integration within my two cases in the future, therefore, it is not impossible 
that the levels of integration will shift. In Kyrgyzstan, an interesting point is that the non-
integrating portions of the Russian-speaking minority might have already emigrated, leaving 
only those willing to integrate. Considering that an overall poor economic climate already caused 
an exodus within the minority and that many Russian-speakers are wary of growing Kyrgyz 
nationalism, it is not impossible that integration will fall in the future. This is especially true if 
the Kyrgyz government were to take steps to limit the Russian language’s role in society, thereby 
lowering both cultural and structural integration.  
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 Within Estonia while the Russian-speaking minority is less integrated in general, the 
trend of Russian-speakers learning Estonian suggests that the community is moving towards 
greater integration. In addition, the Estonian government has taken steps to better accommodate 
the Russian-speaking minority, creating a governmental news source that reports in Russian not 
Estonian, which will improve both structural and cultural integration.114 Considering the already 
strong and growing Estonian, it could be that the Estonian Russian-speaking minority will 
continue to integrate while the Russian-speaking minority in Kyrgyzstan may face issues that 
slow or prevent further integration.  
These results have certain implications for studying the Russian-speaking minority in 
Ukraine. The irredentist portions of Ukraine’s Russian-speaking population may be a result of 
political institutions that failed to foster integration. They could also be a result of a poor 
economic environment in comparison to the Russian Federation or other post-Soviet neighbors. 
Ukraine is an interesting case in comparison with Estonia especially, as in many ways the 
Estonian government adopted more discriminatory policies towards the Russian-speaking 
minority than the Ukrainian government. Even though Narva came close to pursuing autonomy 
from Estonia, it stopped short of the actions that are now evident in the Donbas. An important 
difference and factor, therefore, might be Russian intervention. This calls into question, however, 
why was it that Russia became involved in Ukraine but has not in Estonia? An in depth study of 
the political institutions of Ukraine and relative economic position might reveal some causal 
explanations for the current civil war.  
114 Olena Makarenko, “How Estonian Public Broadcasting Creates an Alternative to Russian 
Propaganda,” Euromaidan Press, September 25, 2017, 
http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/09/25/how-estonian-public-broadcasting-creates-an-
alternative-to-russian-propaganda/. 
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